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Raiﬀa (1961) criticizes ambiguity-averse preferences by claiming that hedging is
possible with randomization of choices. We argue that the timing of randomization is
crucial for hedging. Ex-ante randomizations, which are randomizations before a state
is realized, could provide only ex-ante hedging but not ex-post hedging, in contrast to
ex-post randomizations, which are randomizations after a state is realized. However,
these two randomizations have been assumed to be indiﬀerent under the reversal of
order axiom proposed by Anscombe and Aumann (1963). We, therefore, propose a
weaker axiom, the indiﬀerence axiom, which allows heterogeneous attitudes toward
the timing of randomization. By using this new axiom as well as standard axioms,
we provide an extension of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Maxmin preferences that
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1treats a preference for ex-ante randomizations separately from a preference for ex-post
randomizations. In the representation, a single parameter characterizes a preference
for ex-ante randomizations. By parsimoniously changing only the value of that sin-
gle parameter, the representation can be consistent with Raiﬀa’s (1961) normative
argument as well as recent experimental evidence.
Keywords: Ambiguity; randomization; Ellsberg paradox; maxmin utility.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D81, D03.
1 Introduction
Ellsberg (1961) proposed the following thought experiment: Consider an urn containing
balls, each of which is either red or black. There is no further information about the
contents of the urn. You bet on the color of the ball that you will draw. If your bet turns
out to be correct, then you get a positive payoﬀ (i.e., 1). Typically, subjects are indiﬀerent
between betting on either color. However, they strictly prefer the ﬁfty-ﬁfty objective lottery
between 1 and 0 to the bets. This behavior is called ambiguity aversion.
Raiﬀa (1961) criticizes ambiguity-averse preferences with this argument: by ﬂipping a
fair coin to choose on which color to bet, you can hedge and obtain a constant expected
payoﬀ (i.e., the ﬁfty-ﬁfty lottery between 1 and 0) for each color of the ball you will draw.
(See Figure 1.) Since this argument has such strong intuitive and normative appeal, this
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Bet on Black:
Figure 1: Raiﬀa’s (1961) critique (The ﬁrst and second coordinates in payoﬀ proﬁles respec-
tively show the payoﬀs when the color of the drawn ball is red and black. For each color of
the drawn ball, payoﬀs 1 and 0 are equally likely to occur.)
After careful consideration, however, you would realize that even if you ﬂip a coin, you
2have to face ambiguity again after either side of coin appears. That is, as the left tree in
Figure 2 shows, the randomization performed by ﬂipping a coin is ex ante, i.e., before a
state (red or black) is realized. In contrast, the randomization with which you can remove































Figure 2: Ex-ante randomization (left) and ex-post randomization (right) in tree (The solid
lines correspond to the risk introduced by ﬂipping a coin, while the dotted lines corresponds
to the ambiguity of the color of the drawn ball.)
In other words, ex-ante randomizations provide ex-ante hedging, i.e., hedging in ex-ante
expected payoﬀs, but not ex-post hedging, i.e., hedging in ex-post payoﬀs. Admittedly, when
a coin is ﬂipped in the Ellsberg’s (1961) example, the ex-ante expected payoﬀ is constant
(i.e., the ﬁfty-ﬁfty lottery between 1 and 0) and involves no ambiguity, as Raiﬀa (1961)
argues. After either side of the coin appears, however, ex-post payoﬀs associated with each
bet is ambiguous.
The above consideration shows that people would treat ex-ante randomizations and
ex-post randomizations diﬀerently. Indeed, recent experiments found heterogeneous but
systematic relationship between attitudes toward ex-ante randomizations and those toward
ex-post randomizations.1 The present paper proposes an axiomatic model of preferences
for randomizations which describes the heterogeneous attitudes toward both types of ran-
domizations as well as Raiﬀa’s (1961) normative argument, in a parsimonious yet tractable
way.
1For instance, see Dominiak and Schnedler (2010) and Spears (2009). These experiments are discussed
in detail in Section 1.1.
3In one sense, the seminal paper by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) address the issue
of the timing of randomizations. In their domain, an ex-ante randomization is deﬁned
as a lottery on payoﬀ proﬁles over states of the world, such as the lottery illustrated in
Figure 1. Ex-ante randomizations are henceforth indicated by ⊕. For example, the ex-ante
randomization obtained by ﬂipping a coin in the Ellsberg’s (1961) example is denoted as
1
2(1;0) ⊕ 1
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Figure 3: Ex-ante randomization P and ex-post randomization f
In Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) domain, an ex-post randomization is deﬁned as a
state-wise randomization of payoﬀ proﬁles and indicated by +, as is conventional in the lit-
erature. For example, the ﬁfty-ﬁfty ex-post randomization in the Ellsberg’s (1961) example,
with which you can remove all the ambiguity, is denoted as 1
2(1;0) + 1
2(0;1) and shown as
a constant payoﬀ proﬁle f in Figure 3.
However, one axiom assumed by Anscombe and Aumann (1963), the reversal of order
axiom, implies that an ex-ante randomization is indiﬀerent to its ex-post randomization.
For example, the reversal of order axiom implies that P and f are indiﬀerent. Hence, this
axiom precludes the study of a preference for ex-ante randomizations separately from a
preference for ex-post randomizations.
For this reason, we do not assume the reversal of order axiom. Instead, we propose a
new and weaker axiom, the indiﬀerence axiom. To explain this new axiom, ﬁrst notice that
one way to justify the reversal of order axiom is a state-wise comparison: if you look at P
in Figure 3 state-wise (i.e., coordinate-wise), P oﬀers 1 and 0 equally likely for each state
in the same way as f. Indeed, this is the comparison which has been implicitly made by
4Raiﬀa (1961): by ﬂipping a coin, you can hedge and obtain the constant expected lottery
payoﬀ.
There is, however, another natural comparison to make between P and f. If you look at
each payoﬀ proﬁle in the support of P, P oﬀers nonconstant payoﬀ proﬁles, namely, (1;0)
and (0;1), which would be less attractive than the constant payoﬀ proﬁle f under ambiguity
aversion. This way of evaluating is called support-wise comparison. The indiﬀerence axiom
states that two ex-ante randomizations are indiﬀerent if the two randomizations are indif-
ferent not only according to the state-wise comparison but also according to the support-wise
comparison, in contrast to the reversal of order axiom.
Using the indiﬀerence axiom together with the standard axioms used in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), we characterize the Ex-ante/Ex-post (EAP) Maxmin preferences that
capture a preference for ex-ante randomizations and also, but separately a preference for
ex-post randomizations as follows:



















where S is the set of states, C is a subset of the set of all ﬁnitely additive probabilities on
S, and u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
In representation (1), the set C of priors captures a preference for ex-post randomizations
as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). On the other hand, the relative weight ± between the
ﬁrst and the second terms captures a preference for ex-ante randomizations, as will be
formally shown in Section 3.4. To see this, observe that in the ﬁrst term, the minimum
is taken outside of the integral not only with respect to ex-post randomizations but also
with respect to ex-ante randomizations, in contrast to the second term. Therefore, in the
ﬁrst term, ex-ante randomizations provide hedging as much as ex-post randomizations, in
contrast to the second term.
Indeed, representation (1) satisﬁes the reversal of order axiom if and only if ± = 1.
Moreover, this special case implies that by ﬂipping a coin, the decision maker can remove
5all disutilities caused by the ambiguity in the Ellsberg’s (1961) example, as Raiﬀa (1961)
argues should be the case. Given that our purpose is to develop a model which does not
satisfy the reversal of order axiom, one might wonder why it does not suﬃce to consider
the other special case in which ± = 0. However, this special case trivially implies the
independence axiom on ex-ante randomizations so that there is no strict preference for
ex-ante randomizations.
The remainder of Section 1 is organized as follows: Section 1.1 demonstrates how EAP
Maxmin preferences can describe recent experimental evidence; in Section 1.2, the related
literature is discussed. Section 2 then introduces the setup. Section 3 provides an axioma-
tization of EAP Maxmin preferences. Axioms are provided in Section 3.1 and the represen-
tation theorem and sketch of proof are provided in Section 3.2. Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5
investigate properties of EAP Maxmin preferences. Finally, further relationships between
our axioms and the axioms developed by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) are investigated in
Section 4. All formal proofs are in the appendix.
1.1 Experiments
Dominiak and Schnedler (2010) have studied the relationship between attitudes toward ex-
ante randomizations and those toward ex-post randomizations. EAP Maxmin preferences
can parsimoniously describe their experimental evidence. Table 1 shows the numbers of sub-
jects who exhibited a corresponding attitude toward ex-ante and ex-post randomizations.2
Dominiak and Schnedler’s (2010) experimental result might be summarized by the fol-
lowing two points. First, subjects who prefer ex-post randomizations diﬀer in their attitudes
toward ex-ante randomizations. This result is inconsistent not only with the reversal of or-
der axiom but also with Raiﬀa’s (1961) critique. Second, almost all subjects who are ex-post
randomization neutral are ex-ante randomization neutral as well. The result for this group
therefore contrasts with the result for the previous group in that only this group displays the
2In this table, loving and aversion mean strict loving and strict aversion. The table excludes four subjects
who exhibited strict ambiguity loving (i.e., strict ex-post randomization aversion) because ambiguity loving


















Table 1: Attitudes toward ex-ante and ex-post randomizations observed by Dominiak and
Schnedler (2010) (EAP Maxmin utility model can describe the date just depending on the
sign of ±.)
overall consistency predicted by the reversal of order axiom and implied by Raiﬀa’s (1961)
critique.
The ﬁrst observation is explained by the heterogeneity of parameter ± as follows: Suppose
EAP Maxmin preferences exhibit ex-post randomization loving. Then, as will be shown in
Section 3.5, the preferences exhibit ex-ante randomization loving, neutrality, and aversion,
if and only if ± > 0, ± = 0, and ± < 0, respectively, which is consistent with Table 1.
The second observation is also consistent with EAP Maxmin preferences. As will be shown
in Section 3.5, among EAP Maxmin preferences, ex-post randomization neutrality implies
ex-ante randomization neutrality for any ±, which is also consistent with Table 1.
Spears (2009) independently conducted similar experiments to Dominiak and Schnedler
(2010) and has obtained similar tendencies. On the other hand, in a ﬁeld experiment,
Dwenger, K¨ ubler, and Weizs¨ acker (2010) have found a signiﬁcant evidence for ex-ante ran-
domization loving, which is consistent with ± > 0.
1.2 Related Literature
To our knowledge, no other axiomatic papers have studied a preference for ex-ante random-
izations and a preference ex-post randomizations separately.3
3In a diﬀerent context of intertemporal decision making under risk, the recursive expected utility models
entail non-neutral attitudes toward timing of randomization. For instance, see Kreps and Porteus (1978).
7However, there are a few axiomatic papers which relax the reversal of order axiom in
diﬀerent contexts. Among them, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst is Dr` eze (1987),
which identiﬁes state-dependent utilities and subjective probability. A more recent paper
is Seo (2009), which axiomatizes the second order subjective expected utility. Both papers
are diﬀerent from the present paper in the motivations. Indeed, Seo (2009) assumes the
independence axiom on ex-ante randomizations, so that no strict preference for ex-ante
randomizations.
In terms of applications, the present paper is related to a literature on game theory that
studies ambiguity-averse players, in which mixed strategies correspond to ex-ante random-
izations (i.e., lotteries on pure strategies). The special cases of EAP Maxmin preferences
and EAP Choquet preferences (i.e., Choquet counterpart of EAP Maxmin), where ± = 0
or 1, have been used in the literature as follows:4 Klibanoﬀ (1996) and Lo (1996) have
applied EAP Maxmin preferences with ± = 1; Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) have applied
EAP Choquet preferences with ± = 0; Mukerji and Shin (2002) have applied EAP Choquet
preferences with ± = 0 as well as with ± = 1. As these authors note, both assumptions ± = 1
and ± = 0 could provide unintuitively extreme predictions in some games, respectively. In
such games, it can be shown that, ± ∈ (0;1) could predict more reasonable behavior of
ambiguity-averse players than ± = 0 and 1.
2 Setup
For any set X, let ∆(X) be the set of distributions over X with ﬁnite supports. An element
in ∆(X) is called a lottery on X. Let ±x ∈ ∆(X) denote a point mass on x.
Let S be a set of states and let Σ be an algebra of subsets of S. Let Z denote a set
of outcomes. A payoﬀ proﬁle f is called an act and deﬁned to be a Σ-measurable function
from S into ∆(Z) with ﬁnite range. Let F be the set of all acts.
4Since Choquet expected utilities with convex capacity have Maxmin representations, our axiomatization
of EAP Maxmin preferences is also an axiomatize EAP Choquet preferences with convex capacities.
8A preference relation   is deﬁned on ∆(F).5 As usual, ≻ and ∼ denote, respectively,
the asymmetric and symmetric parts of  . A constant act is an act f such that f(s) = f(s′)
for all s;s′ ∈ S.6 For f ∈ F, an element lf ∈ ∆(Z) is a certainty equivalent for f if f ∼ lf.
Finally, ex-ante randomizations and ex-post randomizations are formally deﬁned as fol-
lows:
Deﬁnition: For all ® ∈ [0;1] and P;Q ∈ ∆(F), ®P ⊕ (1 − ®)Q ∈ ∆(F) is a lottery on
acts such that (®P ⊕ (1 − ®)Q)(f) = ®P(f) + (1 − ®)Q(f) ∈ [0;1] for each f ∈ F. This
operation is called an ex-ante randomization.7
Deﬁnition: For all ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F, ®f + (1 − ®)g ∈ F is an act such that
(®f + (1 − ®)g)(s)(z) = ®f(s)(z) + (1 − ®)g(s)(z) ∈ [0;1] for each s ∈ S and z ∈ Z. This
operation is called an ex-post randomization.
3 Axiomatization
To characterize EAP Maxmin preferences, instead of the reversal of order axiom, we assume
the indiﬀerence axiom as well as the axioms used in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
3.1 Axioms
The ﬁrst six axioms are due to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). However, since the reversal of
order axiom is not assumed, both the continuity axiom and the certainty independence axiom
are assumed for ex-ante randomizations and also, but separately, for ex-post randomizations.
Axiom (Weak Order):   is complete and transitive.
Axiom (Continuity):   is von Neumann-Morgenstern continuous with respect to ex-ante
5Elements in ∆(F) are denoted by P;Q, and R. Elements in F are denoted by f;g , and h. Elements
in ∆(Z) are denoted by l;q, and r.
6Elements in ∆(Z) are identiﬁed as constant acts.
7For degenerate lotteries on acts, we write ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g ∈ ∆(F), instead of ®±f ⊕ (1 − ®)±g, for any
® ∈ [0;1], and f;g ∈ F.
9randomizations as well as ex-post randomizations.8
Axiom (Nondegeneracy): There exist z+;z− ∈ Z such that z+ ≻ z−.
Axiom (Monotonicity): For all f;g ∈ F,
f(s)   g(s) for all s ∈ S ⇒ f   g:
If a preference relation   satisﬁes the axioms above, then each act f ∈ F admits a
certainty equivalent lf ∈ ∆(Z). The next axiom is called uncertainty aversion in Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989).
Axiom (Ex-post Randomization Loving): For all ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F,
f ∼ g ⇒ ®f + (1 − ®)g   f:
Mixing constant acts, ex-ante as well as ex-post, does not provide any hedging. This
suggest the next axiom.
Axiom (Ex-ante/Ex-post Certainty Independence):
(i) For all ® ∈ (0;1], P;Q ∈ ∆(F), and l ∈ ∆(Z),
P   Q ⇔ ®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l   ®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)l:
(ii) For all ® ∈ (0;1], f;g ∈ F, and l ∈ ∆(Z),
f   g ⇔ ®f + (1 − ®)l   ®g + (1 − ®)l:
As noted in the introduction, the ﬁnal axiom, the indiﬀerence axiom, states that two
ex-ante randomizations are indiﬀerent if the two randomizations are indiﬀerent not only
according to the state-wise comparison but also according to the support-wise comparison,
8Formally, (i) For all P;Q;R ∈ ∆(F), if P ≻ Q and Q ≻ R, then there exist ® and ¯ in (0;1) such that
®P ⊕ (1 − ®)R ≻ Q and Q ≻ ¯P ⊕ (1 − ¯)R; (ii) For all f;g;h ∈ F, if f ≻ g and g ≻ h, then there exist ®
and ¯ in (0;1) such that ®f + (1 − ®)h ≻ g and g ≻ ¯f + (1 − ¯)h.
10in contrast to the reversal of order axiom. To formalize the state-wise comparison and
the support-wise comparison, state-wise reduction and support-wise reduction of ex-ante
randomizations are introduced as follows:
Deﬁnition: For all P ∈ ∆(F) such that P = P(f1)f1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ P(fn)fn,
(i) an act
fP = (Ps)s∈S
is called the state-wise reduction, where Ps = P(f1)f1(s) + ··· + P(fn)fn(s) for all s ∈ S.
(ii) a lottery
lP = P(f
1)lf1 + ··· + P(f
n)lfn
is called the support-wise reduction.9
In words, the state-wise reduction fP oﬀers the reduced marginal distribution Ps of P
at each state s.10 The supportwise reduction lP oﬀers the certainty equivalent lf instead of
each act f in the support of P. (See Figure 4, for examples of each comparison based on
these reductions.) Given these deﬁnitions, the indiﬀerence axiom is deﬁned as follows:11




(i) fP ∼ fQ
(ii) lP ∼ lQ

 ⇒ P ∼ Q:
As suggested, a stronger axiom without condition (ii) is equivalent to the reversal of
order axiom.12 To demonstrate the implication of the indiﬀerence axiom, in comparison
with the reversal of order axiom, consider two ﬁfty-ﬁfty ex-ante randomizations P and Q
shown in Figure 4.
9For an act f, certainty equivalent lf might not be unique. Hence, supportwise reduction lP might not
be unique in general. However, any supportwise reductions are indiﬀerent regardless of various choices of
certainty equivalents of each act, under the expected utility on ∆(Z) implied by the other axioms.
10Kreps (1988, p. 106) has also proposed this reduction.
11If the indiﬀerence axiom is strengthened to apply (i) and (ii) independently (that is, (i) or (ii) ⇒ P ∼ Q),
together with the other axioms in the theorem, Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) subjective expected utility
is obtained.
































































Figure 4: State-wise comparison and support-wise comparison between P and Q (Both are
indiﬀerent according to the state-wise comparison but are not indiﬀerent according to the
support-wise comparison.)
On the one hand, both P and Q oﬀer the ﬁfty-ﬁfty lottery between 1 and 0 at each
state. Therefore, fP and fQ become the same, so that condition (i) is satisﬁed. Hence, the
state-wise comparison implies that P and Q are indiﬀerent, as required by the reversal of
order axiom.
On the other hand, since the acts in the support of P are ambiguous, lP becomes a
lottery on certainty equivalents of ambiguous acts. While, lQ becomes the ﬁfty-ﬁfty lottery
between 1 and 0 because the acts in the support of Q are constant, namely (1;1) and (0;0).
Hence, according to this support-wise comparison, Q is better than P. This is because,
under ambiguity aversion, lQ ≻ (1;0) ∼ (0;1) ∼ lP.13 Therefore, condition (ii) is not
satisﬁed.
Based on the above two comparisons, therefore, the indiﬀerence axiom does not require
that P and Q are indiﬀerent, as opposed to the reversal of order axiom. This conclusion of
the indiﬀerence axiom would intuitively make more sense than that of the reversal of order
axiom, because Q is essentially the objective ﬁfty-ﬁfty lottery between 1 and 0 and, hence,
involves no ambiguity, in contrast to P.
13Under ambiguity aversion, lQ ≻ (1;0) ∼ (0;1). Hence, the objective expected utility theory implies
lP ∼ (1;0) ∼ (0;1).
123.2 Representation
Before stating the result, we mention that the topology to be used on the space of ﬁnitely
additive set functions on Σ is the weak* topology.
Theorem: For a preference relation   on ∆(F), the following statements are equivalent:
(i) The preference relation satisﬁes Weak Order, Continuity, Nondegeneracy, Monotonicity,
Ex-post Randomization Loving, Ex-ante/Ex-post Certainty Independence, and Indiﬀerence.
(ii) There exist a real number ±, a nonempty convex closed set C of ﬁnitely additive proba-
bility measures on Σ, and a nonconstant mixture linear function u : ∆(Z) → R, such that
  is represented by the function V : ∆(F) → R of the form



















Deﬁnition: A preference relation   on ∆(F) is called an Ex-ante/Ex-post (EAP) Maxmin
preference if it satisﬁes axioms in (i) of Theorem.
3.2.1 Sketch of Proof
In this section, we provide a sketch of proof. Formal proof is in the appendix.
By the standard argument as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), there exists a function V
representing   on ∆(F), which is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation. The axioms of
ex-post randomization loving, ex-ante/ex-post certainty independence, and indiﬀerence will
show that V can be taken so that the restriction U of V on F has a Maxmin representation.
That is, there exists a set C of priors and a mixture linear function u on ∆(Z) such that
U(f) = min¹∈C
∫
S u(f(s))d¹(s). To prove this formally, our new axiom, the indiﬀerence
axiom, is necessary. Without the indiﬀerence axiom, U can be any monotonic function of
the maximin utility.




∈ R2     P ∈ ∆(F)}. On the set D, a binary relation ˆ   is
13deﬁned as follows: for all (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D,
(a;b) ˆ  (a
′;b
′) ⇔ V (P) ≥ V (Q);








= (a′;b′). The indiﬀerence
axiom implies that ˆ   is a well-deﬁned binary relation.
The purpose of the proof is to show that there exists a real number ± such that for any
(a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D, the following equivalence holds:
(a;b) ˆ  (a
′;b
′) ⇔ ±a + (1 − ±)b ≥ ±a
′ + (1 − ±)b
′: (2)
Together with the deﬁnition of ˆ  , this implies that
V (P) ≥ V (Q) ⇔ ±U(fP) + (1 − ±)U(lP) ≥ ±U(fQ) + (1 − ±)U(lQ):
Since both V and U are unique up to positive aﬃne transformation and V = u = U on
∆(Z), then V (P) = ±U(fP) + (1 − ±)U(lP) for all P ∈ ∆(F). A straightforward argument
shows that this equation proves that V has an EAP Maxmin representation.
To prove (2), it is convenient to deﬁne a subset C = {(u(l);u(l)) ∈ R2     l ∈ ∆(Z)}
of D. Then, it will be shown that if (a;b) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, and ® ∈ [0;1], then ®(a;b) +
(1 − ®)(c;c) ∈ D. (See Figure 5.) In addition, ˆ   satisﬁes completeness, transitivity, a
weaker version of continuity, monotonicity on C, and certainty independence deﬁned as
follows: for all (a′;b′);(a;b) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, and ® ∈ [0;1], (a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ⇔ ®(a;b) + (1 −
®)(c;c) ˆ  ®(a′;b′) + (1 − ®)(c;c).14
It is well-known, however, that in general in R2, an additive linear representation such
as (2) requires more than the independence axiom.15 In the rest of the proof, we overcome
this diﬃculty by taking two steps. First, we show (2) on a subset T of D. Then, we extend
the result into D.















Figure 5: Indiﬀerence curves of ˆ   on T
Fix any point (a∗;b∗) in the interior of D.16 Consider the case in which (a∗;a∗) ˆ  (a∗;b∗).17
Take c such that c ≥ a∗. Then, because of the monotonicity, (c;c) ˆ  (a∗;a∗). Hence, by a
weaker version of continuity, we will show that there exists a point (ˆ a;ˆ b) on the line seg-
ment joining (c;c) and (a∗;b∗) such that (ˆ a;ˆ b) ˆ ∼(a∗;a∗).18 Since (a∗;a∗) ∈ C, the certainty
independence property shows that any points on the line segment joining (a∗;a∗) and (ˆ a;ˆ b)
are indiﬀerent.
Let T be the triangle which consists of vertices (c;c);(a∗;a∗), and (ˆ a;ˆ b). By this def-
inition, any point in T can be represented as a convex combination between (c;c) and a
point on the line segment joining (a∗;a∗) and (ˆ a;ˆ b). Since any points on the line segment
joining (a∗;a∗) and (ˆ a;ˆ b) are indiﬀerent and (c;c) belongs to C, therefore, the certainty
independence property will show that the indiﬀerence curves on T are parallel to the line
segment and, hence, linear, as shown in Figure 5. This is because, mixing (c;c) does not
change preferences.
16If the set C of priors is nondegenerate, such a point exists. If C is degenerate, then U(fP) = U(lP), so
that the EAP Maxmin representation holds trivially.
17The other case can be proved in a symmetric way. For details, see footnote 24 in the appendix.
18In the appendix, the weaker version of continuity is called certainty continuity and deﬁned as follows:
for all (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, if (a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ˆ  (c;c) or (c;c) ˆ  (a′;b′) ˆ  (a;b), there exists ® ∈ [0;1]
such that (a′;b′) ˆ ∼®(a;b) + (1 − ®)(c;c).
15Finally, to extend this indiﬀerence curves on T into the whole domain D with linearity
preserved, we study a particular property of D. Choose (a;b) ∈ D. There exists P ∈ ∆(F)






















Therefore, for all (a;b) ∈ D,








. Then (c∗;c∗) belongs to C as well as T . By
(3), a convex combination of (c∗;c∗) and any point in D belongs to T , if the relative
weight on (c∗;c∗) is close enough to 1. (This statement is not true without (3), because
for (a;b) ∈ T , it must hold that a ≥ b.) This observation, together with the certainty
independence property shows that the indiﬀerence curves of ˆ   on T can be extended into
D with linearity preserved. Hence, there exists a desired number ± such that (2) holds.19
3.2.2 Uniqueness
By Theorem, EAP Maxmin preferences can be represented by a triple (±;C;u). Next, we
give the uniqueness property of this representation.
Proposition 1: The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Two triples (±;C;u) and (±′;C′;u′) represent the same EAP Maxmin preference.
(ii) (a) C = C′, and there exist real numbers ® and ¯ such that ® > 0 and u = ®u′+¯; and
(b) If C is nondegenerate, then ± = ±′.
19In our proof, the certainty additivity and the concavity of V and U play an essential role. These two
properties exactly characterize Maxmin preferences. Therefore, with our proof, EAP Maxmin is the most
general EAP representation. In Saito (2008, 2010), a stronger EAP representation is obtained in the context
of other-regarding preferences.
163.3 Characterizations of ±
The parameter ± has a direct behavioral characterization in terms of ex-ante randomization
loving and preference for late randomization:
Axiom (Ex-ante Randomization Loving): For all ® ∈ (0;1) and f;g ∈ F,
f ∼ g ⇒ ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g   f:
Ex-ante randomization neutrality and ex-ante randomization aversion are deﬁned in the
same way by changing the right-hand side of the deﬁnition to ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g ∼ f and to
f   ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g, respectively.
Axiom (Preference for Late Randomization): For all ® ∈ (0;1) and f;g ∈ F,
®f + (1 − ®)g   ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g:
Preference for late randomization means that an ex-post randomization is preferred over
its ex-ante randomization. This is because an ex-post randomization provides hedging in ex-
post utilities, whereas an ex-ante randomization provides hedging only in ex-ante expected
utilities. In addition, indiﬀerence for timing of randomization is deﬁned in the same way
by changing   to ∼, which is nothing but the reversal of order axiom among two acts.
Proposition 2: Suppose   is an EAP Maxmin preference with nondegenerate C.
(i)   exhibits ex-ante randomization loving if and only if ± ≥ 0.
(ii)   exhibits a preference for late randomization if and only if ± ≤ 1.
Note that given the representation, it is easy to see that EAP Maxmin preferences with
± = 0 and ± = 1 exhibit ex-ante randomization neutrality and an indiﬀerence for timing of
randomization, respectively.
3.4 Comparative Attitudes toward Ex-ante Randomization
We now study comparative attitudes toward ex-ante randomizations.
17Deﬁnition: Given two preference relations  1 and  2,  1 is said to be more ex-ante
randomization loving than  2 if, for every P ∈ ∆(F) and every f ∈ F,
P  2 f ⇒ P  1 f:
The next proposition shows that ± captures the attitude toward ex-ante randomiza-
tions.20
Proposition 3: Suppose two EAP Maxmin preferences { i}i=1;2 are represented by {(±i;Ci;
ui)}i=1;2, where C1 and C2 are nondegenerate. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i)  1 is more ex-ante randomization loving than  2.
(ii) ±1 ≥ ±2, C1 = C2, and there exist real numbers ® and ¯ such that ® > 0 and u1 = ®u2+¯.
Note that in (ii), both of the preferences coincide in C as well as in u under normalization.
Therefore, Proposition 3 says that stronger ex-ante randomization loving is characterized
only by a larger value of ±. Therefore, ± can be interpreted as an index of ex-ante random-
ization loving.
3.5 Relationship between Attitudes toward Ex-ante Randomiza-
tions and Attitudes toward Ex-post Randomizations
To conclude this section, implications of EAP Maxmin preferences on the relationship be-
tween attitudes toward ex-ante randomizations and those toward ex-post randomizations
are characterized. In particular, it will be shown that the implications of EAP Maxmin pref-
erences are consistent with Dominiak and Schnedler’s (2010) experimental evidence, which
was summarized by two points in Table 1 in Section 1.1 as follows.
Firstly, among strict ex-post randomization loving subjects, the attitude toward ex-ante
randomizations is quite heterogeneous; but secondly most ex-post randomization neutral
subjects are ex-ante randomization neutral as well. These results are formally described by
20Our notion of comparative attitude toward ex-ante randomizations is similar in spirit to the literature
on comparative ambiguity aversion such as Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
18EAP Maxmin preferences as follows:
Proposition 4: Suppose   is an EAP Maxmin preference.
(i) (a) Suppose ± > 0. Then,   exhibits strict ex-post randomization loving if and only if  
exhibits strict ex-ante randomization loving.21
(b) Suppose ± < 0. Then,   exhibits strict ex-post randomization loving if and only if  
exhibits strict ex-ante randomization aversion.
(c) Suppose ± = 0. Then,   exhibits ex-ante randomization neutrality.
(ii) For any ±, if   exhibits ex-post randomization neutrality, then   exhibits ex-ante ran-
domization neutrality.
Part (i) shows that the heterogeneity observed in the experiment can be described simply
by the sign of ±. Part (ii) shows that among EAP Maxmin preferences, ex-post randomiza-
tion neutrality implies ex-ante randomization neutrality, as observed in the experiment.
4 Concluding Remarks
To conclude the paper, the relationship between our axioms and axioms used in Anscombe
and Aumann (1963) are discussed. As noted, we will show that the state-wise indiﬀerence
axiom, which is a strengthening of the indiﬀerence axiom by dropping the support-wise
comparison, is equivalent with the reversal of order axiom. Based on this result above, we
also show that the reversal of order axiom implies the indiﬀerence axiom but not vice versa,
and the indiﬀerence axiom, in turn, implies the reduction of compound lotteries axiom but
not vice versa.
First, the reversal of order axiom proposed by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) is formally
deﬁned as follows:
Axiom (Reversal of Order): For all set {fi}n
i=1 of acts and set {®i}n
i=1 of nonnegative
21Strict loving and strict aversion are deﬁned by strict preferences.
19numbers such that
∑n
i=1 ®i = 1,
®1f
1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ ®nf
n ∼ ®1f
1 + ··· + ®nf
n:
As noted, the reversal of order axiom turns out to be equivalent to the following axiom:
Axiom (State-wise Indiﬀerence): For all P;Q ∈ ∆(F),
fP ∼ fQ ⇒ P ∼ Q:
Proposition 5: The reversal of order axiom and the state-wise indiﬀerence axiom are
equivalent.
Note that the state-wise indiﬀerence axiom is a strengthening of the indiﬀerence axiom
by dropping the requirement of the support-wise comparison. Hence,
Corollary : The reversal of order axiom implies the indiﬀerence axiom.
As the example illustrated by Figure 4 in Section 3 shows, the converse of Corollary
is not true. However, the indiﬀerence axiom implies the reversal of order axiom among
constant acts. Formally,
Axiom (Reduction of Compound Lotteries): For all set {li}n
i=1 of lotteries and set {®i}n
i=1
of nonnegative numbers such that
∑n
i=1 ®i = 1,
®1l
1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ ®nl
n ∼ ®1l
1 + ··· + ®nl
n:
Proposition 6: The indiﬀerence axiom implies the reduction of compound lotteries axiom.
20Appendix: Proofs
A Proof of Theorem
The necessity of axioms is easy to check. Note that Monotonicity is imposed only on the
set F of acts. Thus, EAP Maxmin preferences immediately satisfy the axiom since the
preferences reduce into Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Maxmin preferences on F. To show
Continuity, note that the set of ﬁnitely additive probabilities measures is compact under the
product topology. Therefore, the closed subset C is compact. Hence, the Berge’s Maximum
Theorem can be applied.
In the following, we will prove the suﬃciency. The ﬁrst lemma shows the existence of a
utility function of   as follows:
Lemma 1: Suppose that the preference relation   on ∆(F) satisﬁes the axioms in Theo-
rem. Then, there exists a utility function V representing   such that
(i) for all ® ∈ [0;1], P ∈ ∆(F), and l ∈ ∆(Z), V (®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®V (P) + (1 − ®)V (l),
(ii) V is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation,
(iii) moreover, there exists a nonempty convex closed set C of ﬁnitely additive probabil-




Proof of Lemma 1: From the implication of the von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Theorem,
there exists a mixture linear function u : ∆(Z) → R representing   restricted to ∆(Z).
In addition, u is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation. Thus, choose u such that
u(z+) = 1 and u(z−) = −1.
For an arbitrary P ∈ ∆(F), deﬁne
MP = {®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l|l ∈ ∆(Z) and ® ∈ [0;1]}:
Thus, MP is the set of ex-ante randomizations of P and the constant acts. Using the von
Neumann-Morgenstern’s Theorem again, there is a function VP : MP → R representing
21  restricted to MP, which is mixture linear with respect to the ex-ante randomizations.
In addition, VP is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation. Thus, choose VP such that
VP(z+) = 1 and VP(z−) = −1.
For all l;r ∈ ∆(Z) VP(l) ≥ VP(r) ⇔ l   r ⇔ u(l) ≥ u(r). Hence, there exists an
increasing function v : u(∆(Z)) → R such that VP(l) = v(u(l)) for all l ∈ ∆(Z). Note that
by Proposition 6,   satisﬁes Reduction of Compound Lotteries. This property together
with mixture linearities of Vp and u shows that v is also mixture linear.22 In addition, by
the normalization, v(1) = 1 and v(−1) = −1. Hence, we can conclude that v is the identity
function, so that VP(l) = u(l).
Now, we deﬁne a real-valued function V on ∆(F) which represents   by V (P) = VP(P)
for all P ∈ ∆(F). Note that V is well deﬁned, because if R ∈ MP ∩ MQ, then VP(R) =
VQ(R). In addition, for all ® ∈ [0;1], P ∈ ∆(F), and l ∈ ∆(Z),
V (®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = VP(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®VP(P) + (1 − ®)VP(l) = ®V (P) + (1 − ®)V (l):
Hence, parts (i) and (ii) hold.
Finally, to show (iii), ﬁx ® ∈ [0;1], f ∈ F, and l ∈ ∆(Z). Note Indiﬀerence shows
that for all ® ∈ [0;1], f ∈ F, and l ∈ ∆(Z), ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)l ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)l.23 Hence,
V (®f + (1 − ®)l) = V (®f ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®V (f) + (1 − ®)V (l), where the second equality
is by (i). Moreover, Ex-post Randomization Loving shows that if V (f) = V (g), then
V (®f+(1−®)g) ≥ V (f) for all f;g ∈ F and ® ∈ [0;1]. Therefore, by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), these two properties (the certainty additivity and the concavity) and continuity with
respect to ex-post randomizations shows that V has a Maxmin representation on F. Hence,
part (iii) holds.  
22Choose a;b ∈ u(∆(Z)) and ® ∈ [0;1] to show v(®a + (1 − ®)b) = ®v(a) + (1 − ®)v(b). There exist
l;r ∈ ∆(Z) such that u(l) = a and u(r) = b. Then by Reduction of Compound Lotteries, v(®a+(1−®)b) =
v(u(®l+(1−®)r)) = VP(®l+(1−®)r) = VP(®l⊕(1−®)r) = ®VP(l)+(1−®)VP(r) = ®v(a)+(1−®)v(b).
23To see this, let P = ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)l. Then, for all s ∈ S, Ps = ®f(s) ⊕ (1 − ®)l, note that condition
(i) in Indiﬀerence is trivially satisﬁed. In addition, since lf ∼ f, Ex-post Certainty Independence shows
lP = ®lf + (1 − ®)l ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)l, so that condition (ii) in Indiﬀerence is satisﬁed as well. Hence,
Indiﬀerence shows P ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)l.
22Henceforth, we assume that the preference relation   on ∆(F) satisﬁes the axioms in
Theorem. Then by Lemma 1, there exists a utility function V representing   and satisfying
the properties (i), (ii), and (iii) in Lemma 1. Let U be the restriction of V on F. Thus, U
is a maxmin representation deﬁned with a set C of priors and a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function u. Hereafter, we ﬁx this V;U;C, and u.





























That is, U(fP) and U(lP) respectively coincide with the ﬁrst term and the second term of
EAP Maxmin utility.
By using (4), the next lemma proves Theorem in the case where C is degenerate.
Lemma 2: Suppose that the preference relation   on ∆(F) satisﬁes the axioms in Theorem.
If C is degenerate, there exists a real number ± such that (±;C;u) is an EAP Maxmin
representation.









S u(f(s))d¹(s)dP(f) = U(lP), where the second
equality is by the Fubini’s Theorem. Therefore, fP ∼ lP. Hence, Indiﬀerence shows that for
all P ∈ ∆(F), P ∼ fP ∼ lP. Therefore, V (P) = U(fP) = U(lP). Thus, there exists a real
number ± such that V (P) = ±U(fP) + (1 − ±)U(lP).  
Hereafter, we consider the case where C is nondegenerate. We will prove three lemmas
to complete the proof. First, we will show a representation result for a preference relation ˆ  
on a subset set D of R2. To show the statement, we deﬁne two properties of the preference
as follows:
(i) ˆ   is said to satisfy Certainty Independence, if the following condition holds: for all
(a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, ® ∈ [0;1], (a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) if and only if ®(a;b) + (1 −
®)(c;c) ˆ  ®(a′;b′) + (1 − ®)(c;c),
23(ii) ˆ   is said to satisfy Certainty Continuity, if the following condition holds: for all
(a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, if (a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ˆ  (c;c) or (c;c) ˆ  (a′;b′) ˆ  (a;b), there ex-
ists ® ∈ [0;1] such that (a′;b′) ˆ ∼®(a;b) + (1 − ®)(c;c).
Lemma 3: Let D ⊂ R2 and C = D ∩ {(a;a)|a ∈ R}. Suppose that
(a) for any (a;b) ∈ D, a ≥ b,
(b) for all (a;b) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, and ® ∈ [0;1], ®(a;b) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ∈ D,
(c) there exists (a∗;b∗) ∈ D and (c;c);(c;c) ∈ C such that a∗ > b∗ and c > a∗ > c.
If a preference relation ˆ   on D satisﬁes Completeness, Transitivity, Monotonicity on C,
Certainty Independence, and Certainty Continuity, then there exists a unique real number
± such that (a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ⇔ ±a + (1 − ±)b ≥ ±a′ + (1 − ±)b′.
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider the case where (a∗;a∗) ˆ  (a∗;b∗). By assumption (c), c > a∗.
Monotonicity on C shows (c;c) ˆ ≻(a∗;a∗). Then by Certainty Continuity, there exist ® > 0




by (ˆ a;ˆ b).
24 Then, (ˆ a;ˆ b) ˆ ∼(a∗;a∗).
Let T be a triangle including the interior which consists of the vertices (c;c), (a∗;a∗),
and (ˆ a;ˆ b) as shown in Figure 5 in Section 3.2.1.25
The ﬁrst step shows that the preference ˆ   is well deﬁned on T .
Step 1: T is a nondegenerate subset of D.
Proof of Step 1: Since a∗ > b∗ and, in addition, ® > 0, then ˆ a > ˆ b. Therefore, (a∗;a∗) ̸=
(ˆ a;ˆ b) ̸= (c;c). Hence, T is not degenerate. Choose any (a;b) ∈ T to show (a;b) ∈ D. Since
T is the triangle, the Carath´ eodory’s Theorem (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemar´ echal (1949, p.
24In the other case where (a∗;b∗) (a∗;a∗), there exist ® > 0 such that (a∗;a∗) ˆ ∼®(a∗;b∗)+(1−®)(c;c).
Denote
(
®c + (1 − ®)a∗;®c + (1 − ®)b∗)
by (˜ a;˜ b). Then, instead of the triangle T deﬁned in the proof,
consider a triangle, including the interior, which consists of the vertices (˜ c;˜ c), (c;c), and (a∗;a∗). Then, the
rest of the proof goes through exactly in the same way.
25Formally, T =
{











where ⟨·;·⟩ is a inner product.
2429, Theorem 1.3.6)) shows that there exist ®;¯ ∈ [0;1] such that
(a;b) = ®(c;c) + ¯(a∗;a∗) + (1 − ® − ¯)(ˆ a;ˆ b)
= (® + ¯)(c;c) + (1 − ® − ¯)(ˆ a;ˆ b);
where c ≡ ®
®+¯c +
¯
®+¯a∗. Therefore, since (ˆ a;ˆ b) ∈ D and (c;c) ∈ C, it follows from
assumption (b) that (a;b) ∈ D.  
The next step shows the existence of the desired real number ± on the restricted domain
T as follows:
Step 2: There exists a real number ± such that for any (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ T , (a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ⇔
±a + (1 − ±)b ≥ ±a′ + (1 − ±)b′.
Proof of Step 2:
Substep 2.1: For all (a;b) ∈ T , there exists a unique number ® ∈ [0;1] such that
(a;b) ˆ ∼®(c;c) + (1 − ®)(a∗;a∗).
Proof of Substep 2.1: Choose any (a;b) ∈ T . Since T is the triangle, the Carath´ eodory’s
Theorem, again, shows that there exist ®;¯ ∈ [0;1] such that (a;b) = ®(c;c) + ¯(a∗;a∗) +
(1 − ® − ¯)(ˆ a;ˆ b). Since (ˆ a;ˆ b) ˆ ∼(a∗;a∗), Transitivity and Certainty Independence show
(a;b) ˆ ∼®(c;c) + (1 − ®)(a∗;a∗). Since c > a∗, Monotonicity on C shows that ® is unique.
Hence, Substep 2.1 is proved.
For all (a;b) ∈ T , deﬁne
c(a;b) = ®c + (1 − ®)a
∗;
where ® is as in Substep 2.1.




ˆ a − a∗
ˆ a −ˆ b
.




a − ®c − (1 − ®)a∗
a − b
=
ˆ a − a∗
ˆ a −ˆ b
;
25The ﬁrst equality holds because c(a;b) = ®c + (1 − ®)a∗. To see the second equality, note
that by the Carath´ eodory’s Theorem, (a;b) = ®(c;c)+¯(a∗;a∗)+(1−®−¯)(ˆ a;ˆ b) for some
®;¯ ∈ [0;1]. Thus, a−®c−(1−®)a∗ = (1−®−¯)(ˆ a−a∗) and a−b = (1−®−¯)(ˆ a−ˆ b).
Hence, Substep 2.2 is proved.
Deﬁne
± = 1 −
ˆ a − a∗
ˆ a −ˆ b
:
By substituting this into the result of Substep 2.2, we conclude that for all (a;b) ∈ T ,
c(a;b) = ±a + (1 − ±)b:
Substep 2.3. For any (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ T , (a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ⇔ ±a + (1 − ±)b ≥ ±a′ + (1 − ±)b′.
Proof of Substep 2.3: Choose any (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ T . Then
(a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ⇔ (c(a;b);c(a;b)) ˆ  (c(a′;b′);c(a′;b′)) (∵ Substep 2.1)
⇔ c(a;b) ≥ c(a′;b′) (∵ Monotonicity on C)
⇔ ±a + (1 − ±)b ≥ ±a′ + (1 − ±)b′: (∵ Deﬁnition of c)  
The next step extends the result of Step 2 on the whole domain D as follows:
Step 3: For all (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D, (a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ⇔ ±a + (1 − ±)b ≥ ±a′ + (1 − ±)b′.
Proof of Step 3: Let c∗ = 1
2c + 1
2a∗. Choose any (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D. Then, by assumption
(a), a ≥ b and a′ ≥ b′. Thus, it follows that there exists ® ∈ (0;1] such that ®(a;b) + (1 −
®)(c∗;c∗) and ®(a′;b′) + (1 − ®)(c∗;c∗) belong to T . Therefore,
(a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ⇔ ®(a;b) + (1 − ®)(c∗;c∗) ˆ  ®(a′;b′) + (1 − ®)(c∗;c∗)
⇔ ±(®a + (1 − ®)c∗) + (1 − ±)(®b + (1 − ®)c∗) (∵ Step 2)
≥ ±(®a′ + (1 − ®)c∗) + (1 − ±)(®b′ + (1 − ®)c∗)
⇔ ±a + (1 − ±)b ≥ ±a′ + (1 − ±)b′:  
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.  
26With using Lemma 3, we prove the suﬃciency of Theorem as follows. Let
D = {(U(fP);U(lP)) ∈ R
2|P ∈ ∆(F)} and C = {(u(l);u(l)) ∈ R
2|l ∈ ∆(Z)}:
To deﬁne a binary relation ˆ   on D, it is convenient to deﬁne a real-valued function v on D
as follows: For all (a;b) ∈ D, deﬁne v(a;b) = V (P), where P ∈ ∆(F) such that U(fP) = a
and U(lP) = b. (It will be shown that v is well deﬁned by Lemma 5.) With this function v,
we deﬁne a binary relation ˆ   on D as follows. For all (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D, deﬁne
(a;b) ˆ  (a
′;b
′) ⇔ v(a;b) ≥ v(a
′;b
′):
It will be shown by Lemma 4 that the set D satisﬁes the properties of (a), (b), and (c) in
Lemma 3. In addition, it will be shown by Lemma 5 that the preference relation ˆ   satisﬁes
the properties in Lemma 3. Deﬁne W(P) = ±U(fP)+(1−±)U(lP) for all P ∈ ∆(F). Then,
by these lemmas, for all P;Q ∈ ∆(F),
P   Q ⇔ V (P) ≥ V (Q) (∵ Lemma 1)
⇔ v(U(fP);U(lP)) ≥ v(U(fQ);U(lQ)) (∵ Deﬁnition of v)
⇔ (U(fP);U(lP)) ˆ  (U(fQ);U(lQ)) (∵ Deﬁnition of ˆ  )
⇔ ±U(fP) + (1 − ±)U(lP) ≥ ±U(fQ) + (1 − ±)U(lQ) (∵ Lemma 3)
This shows W as well as V represent   on ∆(F). In addition, for all P ∈ ∆(F);l ∈ ∆(Z),
and ® ∈ [0;1],
W(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ±U(f®P⊕(1−®)l) + (1 − ±)U(l®P⊕(1−®)l)
= ±(®U(fP) + (1 − ®)U(fl)) + (1 − ±)(®U(lP) + (1 − ®)U(ll))
= ®W(P) + (1 − ®)W(l):
Thus, W as well as V satisfy property (i) in Lemma 1. Furthermore, W = U = V on F.
Since V is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation, it follows that V (P) = W(P) ≡
27±U(fP)+(1−±)U(lP) for all P ∈ ∆(F). Substituting (4) shows that V has a EAP Maxmin
representation. This completes the suﬃciency of Theorem, given Lemmas 4 and 5.
In the following, we will prove Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Lemma 4: Suppose that the preference relation   on ∆(F) satisﬁes the axioms in Theorem.
Then, the following results hold: (a) for any (a;b) ∈ D, a ≥ b,
(b) for all (a;b) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, and ® ∈ [0;1], ®(a;b) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ∈ D,
(c) there exists (a∗;b∗) ∈ D and (c;c);(c;c) ∈ C such that a∗ > b∗ and c > a∗ > c.
Proof of Lemma 4: To show (a), choose (a;b) ∈ D. There exists P ∈ ∆(F) such that





















dP(f) = U(lP) = b:
To show (b), choose any (a;b) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, and ® ∈ [0;1]. Then, there exist
P ∈ ∆(F) and l ∈ ∆(Z) such that (a;b) = (U(fP);U(lP)) and u(l) = c. Hence, a direct
calculation based on (4) shows U(f®P⊕(1−®)l) = ®U(fP) + (1 − ®)u(l) = ®a + (1 − ®)c and
U(l®P⊕(1−®)l) = ®U(lP)+(1−®)u(l) = ®b+(1−®)c. Therefore, ®(a;b)+(1−®)(c;c) ∈ D.
In the following, we will show (c). By the nondegeneracy of C, there exist f;g ∈ F
such that 1
2f + 1
2g ≻ f ∼ g.26 There exists z+;z− ∈ Z such that z+ ≻ z− because of
Nondegeneracy of  . Let l0 = 1
2±z+ + 1
2±z¡. By appropriately mixing l0 with f and g, we
respectively obtain f∗ and g∗ such that 1
2f∗+ 1
2g∗ ≻ f∗ ∼ g∗ and z+ ≻ 1
2f∗+ 1





2g∗) > U(f∗) = U(l 1
2f¤⊕ 1








2g¤)), c = U(z+), and c = U(z−). Therefore,
a∗ > b∗ and c > a∗ > c.  
Lemma 5: Suppose that the preference relation   on ∆(F) satisﬁes the axioms in Theorem.
Then, the preference relation ˆ   satisﬁes Completeness, Transitivity, and Monotonicity on
26Otherwise, f ∼ g ⇒ 1
2f + 1
2g ∼ f for all f;g ∈ F. This implies the subjective expected utility, so that
C becomes degenerate.
28C, Certainty Independence, and Certainty Continuity.
Proof of Lemma 5: To show Completeness and Transitivity, it suﬃces to show v is a
well-deﬁned function. That is, if there exist P;Q ∈ ∆(F) such that (U(fP);U(lP)) =
(U(fQ);U(lQ)), then V (P) = V (Q). The equality (U(fP);U(lP)) = (U(fQ);U(lQ)) shows
that conditions (i) and (ii) in Indiﬀerence are satisﬁed. Therefore, Indiﬀerence shows V (P) =
V (Q).
To show Monotonicity in C, choose any (c;c);(c′;c′) ∈ C. Then there exist l;l′ ∈ ∆(Z)
such that u(l) = c and u(l′) = c′. Hence, (c;c) ˆ  (c′;c′) ⇔ v(u(l);u(l)) ≥ v(u(l′);u(l′)) ⇔
V (l) ≥ V (l′) ⇔ u(l) ≥ u(l′) ⇔ c ≥ c′.
To show Certainty Independence, choose any (a;b);(a′;b′);(c;c) ∈ D and ® ∈ [0;1].
Then, there exist P;Q ∈ ∆(F) and l ∈ ∆(Z) such that (a;b) = (U(fP);U(lP)), (a′;b′) =
(U(fQ);U(lQ)), and (c;c) = (u(l);u(l)). A direct calculation based on (4) shows
®(a;b) + (1 − ®)(c;c) = (U(f®P⊕(1−®)l);U(l®P⊕(1−®)l));
®(a′;b′) + (1 − ®)(c;c) = (U(f®Q⊕(1−®)l);U(l®Q⊕(1−®)l)):
Therefore,
(a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ⇔ V (P) ≥ V (Q)
⇔ ®V (P) + (1 − ®)V (l) ≥ ®V (Q) + (1 − ®)V (l)
⇔ V (®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) ≥ V (®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)l) (∵ Lemma 1 (i))
⇔ ®(a;b) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ˆ  ®(a′;b′) + (1 − ®)(c;c):
To show Certainty Continuity, choose any (a;b);(a′;b′) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C such that
(a;b) ˆ  (a′;b′) ˆ  (c;c). Then, there exist P;Q ∈ ∆(F) and l ∈ ∆(Z) such that (U(fP);U(lP))
= (a;b), (U(fQ); U(lQ)) = (a′;b′), and u(l) = c. Then P   Q   l. Then by Continuity,
there exists ® ∈ [0;1] such that Q ∼ ®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l. Therefore,
(a
′;b
′) = (U(fQ);U(lQ)) ˆ ∼(U(f®P⊕(1−®)l);U(l®P⊕(1−®)l)) = ®(a;b) + (1 − ®)(c;c):
29The other case where (c;c) ˆ  (a′;b′) ˆ  (a;b) is proved in the same way.
 
B Proof of Propositions
To prove propositions, it is convenient to show the following claim:
Claim: For EAP Maxmin preferences, if C is nondegenerate, then there exist f∗;g∗; ˆ f; ˆ g ∈
F such that 1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗ ≻ f∗ ∼ g∗, 1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g ≻ ˆ f ∼ ˆ g, and 1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1
2ˆ g ∼ 1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗.
Proof of Claim: By the proof of statement (c) in Lemma 4, if C is nondegenerate, then
there exist f∗;g∗ ∈ F such that 1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗ ≻ f∗ ∼ g∗ and z+ ≻ 1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗ ≻ z−. We will





2g∗. By Continuity, there exists ® ∈ [0;1] such that 1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗ ∼
®±z+ ⊕ (1 − ®)(1
2f∗ ⊕ 1
2g∗). Let ˆ f = ®±z+ + (1 − ®)f∗ and ˆ g = ®±z+ + (1 − ®)g∗. Then,
1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g ≻ ˆ f ∼ ˆ g and 1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1







2g∗. By mixing z−, instead of z+, the claim is proved in the same
way as in Case 1.  
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
It is easy to see that (ii) implies (i). In the following, we will show that (i) implies (ii). Fix  
on ∆(F). Let (±;C;u) and (±′;C′;u′) represent  , then u and u′ are aﬃne representations
of   restricted on ∆(Z). Hence, by the standard uniqueness results, there exist ® > 0 and
¯ ∈ R such that u = ®u′ + ¯. The uniqueness of C follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), so that C = C′.
To show ± = ±′, let V and V ′ be EAP Maxmin representations deﬁned by (±;C;u) and
(±′;C′;u′), respectively. Let U and U′ be the restrictions of V and V ′ on F, respectively.
Then, U = ®U′+¯. Since C is nondegenerate, Claim shows that there exist f∗;g∗; ˆ f; ˆ g ∈ F
such that 1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g ≻ ˆ f ∼ ˆ g, and 1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1





ˆ f + 1




ˆ f + 1




2g∗) − U( ˆ f)
U(1
2
ˆ f + 1




2g∗) − U′( ˆ f)
U′(1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g) − U′( ˆ f)
= ±
′;
where the second equality holds because U = ®U′ + ¯.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose   is an EAP Maxmin preference represented by V with nondegenerate C. Let U
be the restriction of V on F. By the nondegeneracy of C, there exist f∗;g∗ ∈ F such that
U(1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗) > U(f∗) = U(g∗).
To show (i), ﬁx ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F such that f ∼ g. Since V (®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g) =
±U(®f + (1 − ®)g) + (1 − ±)U(f), then
V (®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g) ≥ U(f) ⇔ ±U(®f + (1 − ®)g) ≥ ±U(f)
⇔ ±(U(®f + (1 − ®)g) − U(f)) ≥ 0:
Since U(®f + (1 − ®)g) ≥ U(f) and U(1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗) > U(f∗), therefore,   exhibits ex-ante
randomization loving if and only if ± ≥ 0.
To show (ii), ﬁx ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F. Since V (®f ⊕(1−®)g) = ±U(®f +(1−®)g)+
(1 − ±)(®U(f) + (1 − ®)U(g)), then
U(®f + (1 − ®)g) ≥ V (®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g)
⇔ (1 − ±)U(®f + (1 − ®)g) ≥ (1 − ±)(®U(f) + (1 − ®)U(g))
⇔ (1 − ±)(U(®f + (1 − ®)g) − (®U(f) + (1 − ®)U(g))) ≥ 0:





therefore,   exhibits a preference for late randomization if and only if ± ≤ 1.
31B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Fix two EAP Maxmin preferences { i}i=1;2 represented by {(±i;Ci;ui)}i=1;2. For all i ∈
{1;2}, suppose that Ci is nondegenerate; let Vi be EAP Maxmin representation deﬁned
with (±i;Ci;ui); and let Ui be the restriction of Vi on F.
Step 1: (i) implies (ii).
Proof of Step 1: Suppose  1 is more ex-ante randomization loving than  2. A straight-
forward argument shows U1 = U2, so that C1 = C2.27 In the following, we will show ±1 ≥ ±2.
Since C2 is nondegenerate, Claim shows that there exist ˆ f; ˆ g ∈ F such that 1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g ≻2
ˆ f ∼2 ˆ g and 1
2




2g∗. Since U1 = U2, 1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g ≻1 ˆ f ∼1 ˆ g. Since  1 is more
ex-ante randomization loving than  2, 1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1





ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g)−Ui( ˆ f) > 0












ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g) + (1 − ±1)U1( ˆ f) = V1(1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1
















ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g) + (1 − ±2)U2( ˆ f) = V2(1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1





Step 2: (ii) implies (i).
Proof of Step 2: Suppose ±1 ≥ ±2, C1 = C2, and there exist ® > 0, ¯ ∈ R such that
u1 = ®u2 + ¯. Then, U1 = ®U2 + ¯. Fix any P ∈ ∆(F) and f ∈ F such that P  2 f to
show P  1 f. We will show the result, in the following two exhaustive cases.
Case 1: U2(fP) =
∫
F U2(g)dP(g). Then V2(P) = U2(fP) ≥ U2(f). Since U1 = ®U2 + ¯,
V1(P) = U1(fP) ≥ U1(f), as desired.
27 For all i ∈ {1;2}, since ui is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation, we can normalize ui by
ui(z+) = 1 and ui(z−) = −1, without loss of generality. Let, l0 = 1
2±z+ + 1
2±z¡. Then, ui(l0) = 0 for all
i ∈ {1;2}. Suppose to the contrary that U1 ̸= U2. Then, without loss of generality, assume that there
exists f ∈ F such that U1(f) > U2(f). Moreover, by the constant linearity, without loss of generality,
assume 1 > U2(f) > 0. Fix a positive number " such that " < min{U1(f) − U2(f);1 − U2(f)}. Deﬁne
l = (U2(f)+")±z+ +(1−U2(f)−")l0. Then Ui(l) = U2(f)+" < U1(f) for all i. Let P = ±l. Then, P ≻2 f
but f ≻1 P. This is a contradiction. Hence, U1 = U2, so that C1 = C2.
32Case 2: U2(fP) ̸=
∫










F U2(g)dP(g) (∵ ±2U2(fP) + (1 − ±2)
∫







F U1(g)dP(g) (∵ U1 = ®U2 + ¯)
Hence, V1(P) = ±1U1(fP) + (1 − ±1)
∫
F U1(g)dP(g) ≥ U1(f), as desired.  
 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose   is an EAP Maxmin preference represented by V . Let U be the restriction of V
on F.
We will show (i). To show (a), suppose ± > 0. It is easy to see that strict ex-post
randomization loving implies strict ex-ante randomization loving. To see the converse,
suppose that   exhibits strict ex-ante randomization loving. Fix ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F
such that f ∼ g to show ®f + (1 − ®)g ≻ f. Since ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g ≻ f, then U(f) <
V (®f ⊕(1−®)g) = ±U(®f +(1−®)g)+(1−±)U(f), so that ±U(f) < ±U(®f +(1−®)g).
Since ± > 0, then U(®f + (1 − ®)g) > U(f). Part (b) is proved in the same way.
Next, we will show (c). Suppose ± = 0 to show ex-ante randomization neutrality. To
show this ﬁx ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F such that f ∼ g. It suﬃces to show ®f ⊕(1−®)g ∼ f.
This indiﬀerence holds because ± = 0 shows V (®f⊕(1−®)g) = ®U(f)+(1−®)U(g) = U(f).
Hence, (i) is proved.
In the following, we will show (ii). Assume ex-post randomization neutrality to show
ex-ante randomization neutrality. To show this, ﬁx ® ∈ (0;1) and f;g ∈ F such that
f ∼ g. It suﬃces to show ®f ⊕(1−®)g ∼ f. Ex-post randomization neutrality implies that
U(®f + (1 − ®)g) = U(f). This implies V (®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g) = U(f), as desired.
33B.5 Proof of Proposition 5
To see that Reversal of Order implies State-wise Indiﬀerence, ﬁx P;Q ∈ ∆(F) such that
fP ∼ fQ to show P ∼ Q. Then, there exist sets {fi}n
i=1 and {gj}m
j=1 of acts and sets
{®i}n
i=1 and {¯j}m
j=1 of nonnegative numbers such that P = ®1f1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ ®nfn, and Q =
¯1g1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ ¯mgm. Then, Reversal of Order shows P ∼ ®1f1 + ··· + ®nfn = fP ∼ fQ =
¯1g1 + ··· + ¯mgm ∼ Q.
To see that State-wise Indiﬀerence implies Reversal of Order, ﬁx any set {fi}n
i=1 of acts
and set {®i}n
i=1 of nonnegative numbers such that
∑n
i=1 ®i = 1. Let P = ®1f1 ⊕···⊕®nfn
and Q = ®1f1+···+®nfn to show P ∼ Q. Then for all s ∈ S, Ps = ®1f1
s +···+®nfn
s = Qs,
so that fP ∼ fQ. Then, State-wise Indiﬀerence shows P ∼ Q.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 6
To see that Indiﬀerence implies Reduction of Compound Lotteries, ﬁx any set {li}n
i=1 of
lotteries and set {®i}n
i=1 of nonnegative numbers such that
∑n
i=1 ®i = 1. Let P = ®1l1 ⊕
··· ⊕ ®nln and Q = ®1l1 + ··· + ®nln to show P ∼ Q. Then, Ps = ®1l1 + ··· + ®nln = Qs
for all s ∈ S, so that condition (i) is satisﬁed. In addition, lP = ®1l1 + ··· + ®nln = lQ, so
that condition (ii) is also satisﬁed. Hence, Indiﬀerence shows P ∼ Q.
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